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I. THE "EXCESSIVE" EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROBLEM
Although the issue of "excessive" compensation for senior corpo-
rate executives is not new,' in recent years the problem of overindulging
top corporate executives with annual million-dollar compensation pack-
ages' has received considerable attention. Such factors as escalating
1. In the years following the Great Depression, for example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
spoke of the "entrenched greed" of corporate executives making more than $15,000 per year. As
a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring corporations to disclose
executive compensation to their shareholders. Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who
Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1992,
at 28-29.
2. In general, compensation packages of top corporate executives vary according to the
particular needs of both the executive and the corporation. Ideally, an independent compensation
committee establishes an executive's compensation package. Such packages typically include
base salary, fringe benefits, perquisites, cash bonuses, long-term incentives such as stock options,
and compensation for termination of employment (possibly in the form of golden parachutes). See
generally GEORGE T. WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD II, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE (3d ed. 1962); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991); ELLEN L. PAVLIK & AHMED BELKAOUI, DETERMINANTS OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (1991). Some compensation packages include other forms of
nonfinancial incentives that are virtually impossible to value-prestige, challenge, and power.
See Sidney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Chief Executive Compensation: A Synthesis and
Reconciliation, 9 SRATEGIC MGMT. J. 543 (1988).
3. This comment contains a nonexclusive catalogue of some of the more outspoken critics of
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CEO salaries and a recessionary economy coupled with increasing lay-
offs4 has caused many to scream, "Unfair!"5 Furthermore, because of
the excessive sums being paid to American CEOs, foreign executives,
particularly the Japanese, have questioned American competitiveness.6
As a result, governmental bodies have made numerous attempts to
address executive compensation, an issue typically reserved for the
shareholders of a corporation.7
Critics see the salaries paid to senior executives as just too high.
"excessive" executive compensation. These commentators hail from a variety of settings,
including the media, politics, investment organizations, corporations, and the American
workplace.
4. Another factor that has brought the executive compensation dilemma to the forefront is
the struggle for corporate control.
Now that the tender offer wave of the 1980s has subsided, institutional investors,
who control on average over 50% of the voting stock of the largest U.S.
corporations, cannot rely on raiders or takeover fears to "discipline" management.
Instead, they promote various techniques-such as proxy rule reform, shareholder
resolutions, and shareholder services groups-to gain access to the boardroom and
make their positions known.
Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 28.
5. Id. The problem of excessive executive compensation was highlighted when President
Bush and his entourage of "overpaid, underperforming executives" traveled on a trade mission to
Japan in January of 1992 to meet with their Japanese counterparts, who earned only a small
percentage of the American executives' total compensation. See James R. Healey & Michelle
Osborn, Bush Contingent Takes Heat Over CEO Pay, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1992, at B I (quoting
Professor Graef Crystal, an outspoken critic and expert in the field of executive compensation,
who was referring to the 21 executives, including the CEOs of the "Big Three" automobile
manufacturers, who accompanied President Bush); see also DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT:
How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95 (1993); Jill
Abramson & Christopher J. Chipello, High Pay of Chief Executives Traveling With Bush Touches
a Nerve in Asia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, at Al.
6. Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 28. Japanese executives argue that "huge pay
lowers employee morale and reduces corporate savings." Healey & Osborn, supra note 5, at BI.
The Japanese executive compensation system, however, has not escaped criticism. Some argue
that "[l]ow pay in Japan fosters expensive gift-giving and lavish expense accounts. Some
Japanese executives have even succumbed to taking kickbacks from suppliers and accepting
sweetheart stock deals." Abramson & Chipello, supra note 5, at A6.
7. The problems associated with allowing corporate democracy to set executive
compensation are discussed further in part II. For a complete discussion in the inherent problems
in allowing corporate democracy to decide executive remuneration, see Carl T. Bogus, Excessive
Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1993).
8. In 1993, for example, Michael D. Eisner, chief executive officer of the Walt Disney
Company, earned combined salary, bonus, and stock options of $203,010,590. John A. Byrne,
That Eye-Popping Executive Pay: Is Anybody Worth This Much?, Bus. WK., Apr. 25, 1994, at
52-53 (noting that Eisner's pay is nearly equal to the gross national product of Grenada); see also
Steve Twomey, Slipping Virginia A Mickey, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1994, at DI.
Eisner is not alone. For instance, in 1993, Joseph R. Hyde IIl, chief executive of Autozone,
Inc., made over $32 million, while Sanford I. Weill of Travelers Corp. made over $52 million.
Byrne, supra, at 53. In 1992, the winner of Forbes' annual survey of top executive pay was
Thomas Frist, Chairman of Hospital Corporation of America. Frist's total compensation for 1992
was $127 million. What 800 Companies Paid Their Bosses, FORBES, May 24, 1993, at 124.
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"[T]here is a point at which compensation goes beyond what we nor-
mally think of as the cost of doing business, and moves into the range of
executive greed and ego gratification."9 Accordingly, these extravagant
compensation packages have raised concern over whether an executive
is really worth what the corporation pays him.' 0 A 1991 study per-
formed by compensation expert Professor Graef Crystal illustrated that
the average CEO earned $2.8 million per year in salary ($1.4 million per
year in salary and bonuses plus $1.4 million in long-term incentives
such as stock options).II While most Americans consider top corporate
executives overpaid,' 2 not all agree.' 3 These extravagant salaries have
even caused some to comment, "anyone who makes that kind of money
must be doing something either illegal or immoral."'14
Professor Charles Yablon recognizes two basic arguments for the
proposition that corporations pay their CEOs too much: "unfair price"
and "unfair process"."' The "unfair price" argument maintains that "cur-
9. 139 CONG. REc. H2170 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hoagland).
Furthermore, in responding to the problem of "conspicuous compensation," Senator Baucus
stated, "Our incomes are like our shoes, if two small they gall and pinch us, but if too large, they
cause us to stumble and to trip." Hearings on Executive Compensation Before the Subcomm. on
Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992), reprinted in 92 TAX
NOTES TODAY 120-47 (1992), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (quoting Charles
Colten, an English clergyman) [hereinafter Hearings on Executive Compensation].
10. Gender-based discrimination in promoting and hiring top executives is beyond the scope
of this comment. In reality, however, except for one woman who shares the position with her
husband, all CEOs of Fortune 500 companies are male. Women in Management: The Spare Sex,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1992, at 17. Thus, the remaining gender references in this comment shall be
masculine.
11. CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 27-28. Crystal notes that the figures do not even accurately
account for the magnitude of the problem. Many CEOs receive far more than the average total
compensation. Id. at 28. Furthermore, the $2.8 million compensation figure does not include the
"values for perquisites and for both regular and supplemental fringe benefits-such as pension
and profit-sharing plans, and life and medical insurance coverages." Id. at 204-05.
A Business Week survey noted that in 1992, the average CEO of a large corporation earned
more than $3.8 million. However, this figure is inflated due to the value of stock options
exercised in a response to President Clinton's efforts to reform the income tax laws. John A.
Byrne, Executive Pay: The Party Ain't Over Yet, Bus. WK., Apr. 26, 1993, at 56-57.
12. In fact, a Gallup Poll conducted in 1990 revealed that the actual percentage of Americans
who considered executive pay "too much" was 71 percent. Jay Schmiedeskamp, Majority of
Americans Think That Top Officials Are Overpaid, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Dec. 1990, at 21-22.
13. For example, professor Kevin Murphy of the Harvard Business School maintains that top
executives deserve their compensation. Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel
They Get, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125. Professor Murphy argues that CEO
compensation is strongly correlated to corporate performance, that incentive plans benefit
shareholders, and that a shift toward long-term incentive plans such as stock options "links
compensation closely to shareholder wealth and motivates managers to look beyond next quarter's
results." Id.
14. Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 29.
15. Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1871 (1992) (book review of GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS:
THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES (1991)).
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rent levels of executive compensation are dramatically out of line with
some relevant basis of comparison."16 Three of the more widely men-
tioned bases for comparison are: (1) comparing the executive compen-
sation with that of the average worker; 17 (2) comparing American
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 27 (discussing the increasing ratio of CEO pay to
average worker pay). Proponents of executive pay reform recognize the "increasing divide
between the most highly-compensated in our economy and the average American." Hearings on
Executive Compensation, supra note 9 (statement of Sen. Boren). During the 1980s, for example,
CEO compensation rose 75% in real terms while the average real wage for American workers
declined. Id. In addition, a Business Week survey noted that in 1980, a CEO earned
approximately 42 times the pay of a factory worker. John A. Byrne, What, Me Overpaid? CEOs
Fight Back, Bus. WK., May 4, 1992, at 143. In 1991, this ratio had increased to approximately
104 times. Id.; see also Hearing on Executive Compensation, supra note 9 (noting the ratio of
CEO pay to average worker pay had increased from 35-100 in ten years); CRYSTAL, supra note 2,
at 27 (same). In 1993, the average CEO earned nearly 150 times that of an average factory
worker. Byrne, supra note 8, at 55.
Senator Boren probably best expressed the "populist" viewpoint when he described the
consequences of a widening gap between the economic classes.
As incomes and lifestyles become increasingly divergent, the sense of community,
the feeling that all Americans are working together as one team in a common effort
to improve the economy and our society for ourselves and for future generations, is
lost. Instead, the average worker feels alienated, permanently excluded from the
American dream that is a reality for fewer and fewer of our citizens.
Hearings on Executive Compensation, supra note 9.
Professor Crystal describes how U.S. tax policy during the 1970s and 1980s helped to spread
the wage gap between executives and average laborers:
The total tax load on highly paid executives has declined substantially at the same
time that the total tax load on the average worker has increased-though only by a
little. The result is that ... the pay of the average worker, expressed in inflation-
discounted dollars and adjusted for taxes, has dropped around 13%, whereas the pay
of the average CEO of a major company, also expressed in inflation-discounted
dollars and adjusted for taxes, has risen more than four times.
CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 27. In addition, Professor Crystal provided a brief history of the philo-
sophical debate over the worth of one's labor.
Plato told Aristotle that no one in a community should earn more than five times the
pay of the lowest-paid worker.... During the Middle Ages, Catholic philosophers
were caught up in debates over the doctrine of just price, which rested on a belief
that there was a divine justification for why one type of labor commanded more pay
than another .... At the end of the nineteenth century, J.P. Morgan decreed that
chief executives of the Morgan enterprises should not be paid more than twenty
times the pay of the lowest worker in the enterprise. (Of course, he may have had a
method to his madness, because by keeping a lid on executive pay, he successfully
lowered costs and increased profits. And guess who owned all the shares?)
Id. at 23-24.
In order to combat the widening pay-gap problem, Representative Martin Sabo of Minnesota
sponsored legislation which would have limited the tax deductibility of executive salaries to 25
times the salary of the lowest paid worker. Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). However, Congress did not adopt this particular method to address the
problem of executive compensation. Instead, Congress opted for the current provision generally
limiting the deductibility of executive remuneration to $1 million. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (Supp. V
1993).
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executives' compensation with that of their foreign counterparts;' 8 and
(3) comparing the executive's compensation to sports figures, entertain-
ers, and professionals such as attorneys and investment bankers.' 9
Indeed, only a brief glance at these three statistical comparisons, particu-
larly the first two, indicate that the executive compensation process
needs drastic reform.
The second argument that Professor Yablon introduces is the
"unfair process" argument.20 This argument asserts that CEOs, and the
corporate boards of directors who generally set their pay,2' do not par-
18. Yablon, supra note 15, at 1872. The gap between compensation for upper management
and compensation for the average worker in the United States is significantly greater than in other
countries which compete with the United States in the international economic environment. See
generally CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 204-13. For example, CEOs in Japan, one of the United
States' staunchest economic competitors, earn only approximately 17 times that of an average
worker. In Germany, that ratio is approximately 23 times. See Hearings on Executive
Compensation, supra note 9 (Statement of Sen. Boren). Because of the greater disparity in the
United States between upper management's compensation and the average worker's
compensation, foreign executives perceive the United States as less competitive. See supra notes
5-6 and accompanying text.
A recent example of a major U.S. corporation helping to expand the chasm between the
compensation of senior management and that of the average worker is Northwest Airlines. In
1993, Northwest rewarded its top five executives with bonuses totaling more than $2.3 million.
That same year, Northwest Airlines threatened to file for bankruptcy protection if workers did not
accept wage concessions. John Dasburg, Northwest's president and chief executive officer,
earned more than $1.6 million in pay and bonuses during the year. Included in the $1.6 million
compensation package was a $750,000 bonus for getting the workforce to accept pay cuts.
Northwest Gave Hefty Bonuses, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 1994, at 3C. In addition, these figures
do not include potential benefits from a stock option plan. Id. Thus, although the United States
prides itself on having one of the only free capitalist economies in the world and generally allows
individuals to price their labor on what it is worth in a "free" marketplace, many feel that some
mechanism, whether it be government run or not, should control excessive pay practices in order
to stifle the widening economic class gap.
19. Yablon, supra note 15, at 1872. Some of the more highly compensated CEOs often
attempt to justify their exorbitant compensation with comparisons to celebrities such as Michael
Jordan, Michael Jackson, or Barbara Streisand. Professor Carl Bogus argues that a more proper
comparison would be made between the CEO and the star's manager or agent. Bogus, supra note
7, at 7 n.30.
Despite intense debate in Congress over whether the new amendment to section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code, section 162(m), should include sports all entertainment stars, partners in
partnerships, and anyone who does not qualify as a "covered employee" of a "publicly held
corporation," the enacted provision only includes the CEO and the four highest paid executives of
a public corporation. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H6125 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Livingston regarding constituant dissatisfaction with exempting entertainment and sports
stars from the $1 million limitation); 139 CONG. REc. E2460 (daily ed. Oct 15, 1993) (statement
of Rep. Solomon discussing the "Friend of Bill Loophole").
20. See Yablon, supra note 15, at 1872.
21. Ideally, "independent" directors set CEO pay in accordance with their fiduciary duty
owed to the shareholders. In reality, though, the board of directors establishes a compensation
committee, consisting of both inside and outside directors, which sets the pay of corporate
management. See generally Jaclyn Fierman, The People Who Set the CEO's Pay, FORTUNE, Mar.
12, 1990, at 58. However, this system creates several conflicts of interest because the CEO of the
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ticipate in "arm's length" negotiations in arriving at a "fair and appropri-
ate" price.22 Senator Lloyd Bentsen acknowledged that the main
problem with the executive compensation determination process lies
with the lack of management accountability. "The problem of executive
pay points to the larger issue. American corporations are too often man-
aged by executives who are not directly accountable to shareholders and
workers but to directors who they typically select themselves. And that
lack of accountability makes American companies insular and less com-
petitive internationally. ' 23  Essentially, CEOs set their own salaries
through the use of a submissive board of directors as well as clever
compensation consultants who draft compensation packages around the
various restraints established for curbing excessive pay.24 In sum, the
lack of management accountability gives rise to a process "relatively
unconstrained by market forces or arms-length bargaining"25 by which
corporations disburse "excessive" pay to its executives.
Another problem closely related to Yablon's "unfair process" argu-
ment is the surprising reality that the level of CEO pay often lacks any
correlation to the company's overall performance.26 " 'The American
corporation frequently nominates these directors. See Bogus, supra note 7, at 34. Thus, the
directors may feel obligated to "pay back" the CEO with a hefty compensation package. In fact,
the CEO and the directors who set his pay might even be friends. Fierman, supra, at 58 ("Yet
another, oh-so-subtle factor that impinges on the objectivity of many corporate paymasters: They
have the tricky task of setting salaries for their peers, who, more often than not, are their
friends."). In addition, corporate directors are often top executives of other companies.
Therefore, they may have an incentive to increase the market value of CEO labor. In fact, some
executives sit on each other's compensation committee. Id. at 58 ("Committee members gauge
the reasonableness of a CEO's salary against their own.") (quoting professor Charles O'Reilly, an
organizational psychologist at the University of California at Berkeley). Furthermore, corporate
directorships have become very lucrative positions as directors typically are paid more than
$32,000 annually. Bogus, supra note 7, at 35. Consequently, these potential conflicts raise
obvious concerns about the fairness of the process for determining executive pay and about the
ability of directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties to shareholders. For an in depth analysis of
corporate law solutions to "excessive" compensation, see infra part II.B.
22. Yablon, supra note 15, at 1872. Professor Yablon further explains what is meant by
"arm's length" bargaining:
The point of such arguments is to show that the price was arrived at under
circumstances approaching perfect competition, a blessed state involving, among
other things, perfect information, large numbers of buyers and sellers, and product
homogeneity. In such a market no individual buyer or seller has any power to
influence price.
Id. at 1872 n. II (citation omitted).
23. 138 CONG. REc. S14866 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
24. See generally CRYSTAL, supra note 2. Professor Yablon addresses the role of the
corporate lawyer and how this role renders ineffective the existing compensation limitations.
Yablon, supra note 15, at 1867, 1883-84.
25. Id. at 1874.
26. See, e.g., Graef S. Crystal, The Wacky, Wacky World of CEO Pay, FORTUNE, June 6,
1988, 68; BOK, supra note 5, at 106-08. But see Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 31
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public is tired of seeing executives make many, many millions of dollars
a year when the stock price goes down, the dividends are cut, and the
book value is reduced' . . and 'the only one who gets the short end of
the stick is the shareholder.' "27 According to a study of 200 corpora-
tions, executive compensation rose 9.4 percent while the median stock
price of the same corporations actually fell 7.7 percent.28 Professors
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy assert that the lack of correlation
between the performance of the company and the CEO's pay is a result
of the reluctance of the board of directors to link a CEO's pay to per-
formance. This risk aversion, Jensen and Murphy argue, results from
"uninvited but influential guests at the managerial bargaining table (the
business press, labor unions, political figures)" who protest the level of
CEO compensation, not the manner in which CEOs are paid.29 There is
something blatantly immoral about a company whose performance has
declined, but yet continues to shower its top management with consider-
able pay raises.30
The problem of "excessive" compensation has become such an
enormous problem that it appears no one knows the appropriate mecha-
nism for its ultimate control. In the past, the only check on the level of
executive compensation was the shareholders who could bring a deriva-
tive suit against the corporation under the corporate waste doctrine,
lobby the board of directors to lower executive pay, or simply sell their
("Taken out of context, any pay plan will appear nonsensical and unfair. But when viewed in the
proper business context, the relationship between pay and performance reemerges.").
27. John A. Byrne, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1992, at 52 (quoting Stanley C. Gault,
chairman of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.).
28. Graef S. Crystal, How Much CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE, June 17, 1991, at 73. Some
commentators assert, however, that while salaries have increased dramatically over the past
several years, the rise in executive compensation results from a desire in the 1980s to pay
executives for their performance through stock-based compensation plans. Brownstein & Panner,
supra note 1, at 31.
29. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 139. Jensen and Murphy also argue that if CEO
pay were more directly linked to corporate performance, average CEO compensation would rise.
Id.
30. During the presidential election race of 1992, President Bill Clinton (then Governor
Clinton) stated:
It's wrong for executives to do what so many did in the 1980s. The biggest
companies raised their (CEOs) pay by four times the percentage their workers' pay
went up and three times the percentage their profits went up. It's wrong to drive a
company into the ground and have the chief executive bail out with a golden
parachute to a cushy life. For Aherica to be competitive, there must be a stronger
link between pay and their performance. An important part of this link is making
management more accountable to shareholders.
Presidential Candidates Divide on Executive Compensation Caps, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 42, at 1634 (Oct. 23, 1992).
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stock.3' In recent years, this heightened concern over executive pay
inequities has prompted numerous legislative, regulatory, and judicial
efforts at governing compensation determinations. Moreover, share-
holder groups such as the United Shareholder's Association and large
institutional investors such as the California Public Employees' Retire-
ment System (CalPERS) have become involved in the struggle to tame
corporate pay abuses. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have also joined the battle. The evi-
dence shows that these efforts have begun to influence compensation
decisions in the corporate boardrooms.32
The ultimate purpose of this Comment is to compare and contrast
the effectiveness of the two regulatory regimes for controlling executive
pay: (1) the enhanced disclosure requirements of the SEC and FASB
along with improved shareholder participation in compensation deci-
sions, and (2) sanctions against the corporation through the use of the
federal income tax code. Part II of this Comment briefly discusses the
availability of market restraints on compensation as well as the different
corporate law restraints that exist for controlling unreasonable compen-
sation for corporate executives including the corporate waste doctrine
and the business judgment rule. Part III introduces the different regula-
tory schemes currently in place, including the new disclosure rules of the
SEC and the proposed rules of the FASB, as well as the newly enacted
limitation on the tax deductibility of "excessive" executive compensa-
tion in the Internal Revenue Code. Part IV provides additional commen-
tary on the new regulatory schemes in the form of a comparative
analysis to determine whether both, either, or neither schemes are neces-
sary. Moreover, Part IV emphasizes the comparison between an infor-
mational approach to the executive compensation problem and a
penalty-oriented approach. Finally, Part V concludes that even with the
existing systems which attempt to place some type of limitation on over-
compensation, in fact, any well-advised corporate compensation deci-
sionmaker can easily circumvent the existing compensation restraints
and pay excessive compensation.
31. See infra part II.B.
32. See Byrne, supra note 11, at 56.
It may finally be happening: The mounting controversy over the growing
paychecks of America's CEOs-not to mention the finger-pointing at complacent
directors-seems to be goading many boards into action. Directors are devoting
more time to the issue of compensation, often challenging the assumptions that lie
behind the pay packages, demanding that they be linked to performance, and ...
hiring outside consultants. Some boards, consultants say, have even eliminated
stock-option grants this year, while many others have cut the size of such awards.
[Vol. 49:795
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II. EXISTING STATE CORPORATE LAW RESTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE
PAY
Before detailing the recent legislative and regulatory attempts at
improving corporate compensation decisions, this Comment discusses
other existing restraints shareholders may rely upon to control the
"excess." First, this Part explains the underlying reason that market
forces alone do not suffice as adequate restraints on compensation.
Next, this Part provides an overview of the state corporate law mecha-
nisms for handling executive pay practices and discusses the increasing
role of large shareholder groups in reforming corporate governance.
A. "Free" Labor Market
Like all other contracts, wages should be left to the fair and free com-
petition of the market and should never be controlled by the interfer-
ence of the legislature.33
This statement reflects the expectation that in a free-market econ-
omy, individuals would negotiate their labor's worth based upon what
the market could afford to pay." Professor Derek Bok took a utopian
view while reflecting upon the way in which corporations would set
CEO pay in an idealistic society:
In the perfectly competitive world so dear to classical economists, all
chief executives would receive amounts approximating what they
added to the net profits of their company. Firms that could benefit
the most from inspired leadership would pay the most money to the
CEO of their choice. Because everyone in this world is perfectly
informed, such companies would proceed unerringly to identify the
best chief executives and offer them more than they were currently
earning. The latter, being motivated primarily by love of money,
would happily agree to serve. In this way, the greatest talent would
move automatically to the firms in which it could do the most good,
resources would be utilized more productively, and everyone would
benefit as a result.3
5
This idealistic scenario, though, does not exist. Professors Berle and
Means recognized that the market can not adequately safeguard against
the inherent conflict between ownership and management within a pub-
33. Byrne, supra note 27, at 53 (quoting David Ricardo, 1817).
34. In fact, supporters of the current high level of executive pay defend these levels as simply
"being... the equilibrium reached by the operation of 'the market.'" Detlev Vagts, Challenges
to Executive Compensation: For the Market or the Courts?, 8 J. CoRP. L. 231, 234 (1983).
Professor Vagts asserts that the executive labor market consists of three related markets: the
labor, product, and capital markets. Id. at 234-40.
35. BOK, supra note 5, at 96.
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lic corporation.3 6 Consequently, management's desire for more com-
pensation, along with its influence in compensation-related decision
making, raises the need for some restraints on the "free" market.
The reluctance of the courts to find executive compensation unrea-
sonable or excessive, however, might reflect a general acceptance of the
market's ability to avoid compensation excesses.37 Nevertheless,
despite assertions that "the market works well enough over time and that
nothing is so amiss that further legislation or regulation is needed, '38
both the federal and state governments, responding to "populist" senti-
ment, have acted and enacted so that this "free" labor market economy
for top corporate executives does not exist. The remainder of this Com-
ment examines the various mechanisms for controlling executive com-
pensation that have rid the United States' executive labor market of its
"freedom" to contract through unhindered negotiation.
B. Corporate Governance, the Rise of Institutional Investors, and
the Role of the Courts
Defects in the compensation decision process generally result from
management's participation in preparing its own compensation pack-
ages. 39  Typically, with the assistance of an outside compensation
expert, CEOs formulate compensation packages to be submitted to the
compensation committee that will, based upon artfully compiled (pro-
management) market data, satisfy almost everyone. 40 According to most
36. Berle and Means enunciated the need for separating ownership and control not only with
regard to compensation decisions, but for others as well. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
Professor Vagts attempted to explain the conflict between management's goals (perhaps to
increase compensation) and the owners' goals (to increase shareholder wealth). Vagts, supra note
34, at 235 ("The separation of ownership and management implies that there may be a conflict of
interest when determining executive compensation; that in some sense management, on behalf of
the shareholders, will be buying its own services and setting the price for them.").
37. For a discussion of courts unwillingness to criticize compensation decisions, see infra part
lI.B.
38. Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders' Growing Role in Executive
Compensation [Part I], N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1992, at 5.
39. CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 42-50.
40. Id. Professor Crystal attempts to explain the absurdity of the process:
A lot of rationalization goes on, and a lot of high-priced talent is retained to prove a
conclusion that the CEO has already made. The compensation committee, because
it meets so infrequently and has no independent counsel, becomes a willing
accomplice. And everybody wins. The CEO gets a raise, the compensation
consultant gets his bills paid, and the compensation committee goes home feeling
good that it is paying for performance or keeping good people or both. Or almost




state corporation laws, a committee consisting of the board of directors4
establishes the compensation of senior executives, 42 keeping in mind the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.43 Based upon the
traditional separation of ownership and management theory of corporate
law," shareholders generally may not participate in ordinary business
decisions of a public corporation, including executive compensation
determinations."5
Nonetheless, shareholders of large public corporations have several
alternative means, both internal and external, to regulate "excessive"
executive compensation. Perhaps the most effective internal control
over compensation policies is the ability to elect independent directors. 46
41. One author notes that "[tioday about 90% of public companies have compensation
committees, and most face a structural dilemma. The CEO, whose pay the committee sets, sits on
both sides of the table. That's because 76% of board chairmen are also CEOs." Fierman, supra
note 21, at 66.
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation."); see also Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (compensation decisions are within the decisionmaking
authority of the board of directors); Bevis Longstreth & Nancy Kane, Shareholders' Growing
Role in Executive Compensation [Part II], N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1992, at 5.
Because the board of directors is generally responsible for the management of the
corporation, the Delaware General Corporation Law appears to provide the board with the
authority to set executive pay. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(5) (1993) (The corporation may
"[a]ppoint such officers and agents as the business of the corporation requires and to pay or
otherwise provide for them suitable compensation."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(15) (1993)
(providing that the corporation may authorize certain benefit plans).
Unless otherwise stated, references to state law in this comment will cite Delaware law
because virtually all consider Delaware the harbinger of corporate law development.
43. A director owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its stockholders and may not
divert business opportunities to himself that are intended for the corporation. See Loft, Inc. v.
Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del.Ch. 1938), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Super. 1939).
44. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36.
45. Longstreth & Kane, supra note 38, at 5 ("Executive compensation decisions traditionally
have been viewed as ordinary business decisions, and as such, absent special charter or by-law
provisions to the contrary, have been placed by state law solely under the authority of the board of
directors. Thus, shareholders have no authority to set executive compensation directly."); see also
McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934). But see Longstreth & Kane, supra note 42, at
5, noting that New York Business Corporation Law § 505(d) requires that "the issue of rights and
options to purchase shares to directors, officers or employees of the corporation or of a subsidiary
or affiliate, as an incentive to service or continued service must be authorized by the shareholders
or pursuant to a plan authorized by the shareholders."
46. In fact, the most widely accepted reform mechanism involves the "facilitat[ion of] the
election of directors thought to be both sufficiently independent and creative to implement rational
and efficient compensation plans." Longstreth & Kane, supra note 38, at 5.
However, there are several obstacles to shareholder action in combating excessive pay. First,
it is generally cheaper and more efficient to sell stock in the corporation than to reform the
corporate pay practices (otherwise known as the "Wall Street Rule"). Bogus, supra note 7, at 41.
In addition, because of the widely dispersed nature of corporate ownership, shareholder
involvement in internal corporate reform through concerted shareholder voting power is almost
impossible. Id. Finally, because compensation inequities are "nothing more than the proverbial
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Moreover, shareholders may potentially influence executive compensa-
tion decisions by amending the corporation's by-laws 47 so long as the
function of the board of directors is not "sterilized. 48 The emergence of
large institutional investors, particularly large pension funds, as well as
the rise of active shareholder movements, such as the United Sharehold-
ers Association, has had a significant impact upon directors' executive
compensation decisions. 49 For example, the California Public Employ-
ees Retirement System, a pension fund which owns approximately one
percent of each publicly traded major corporation in the United States,50
caused both W.R. Grace & Company and ITT Corporation to adopt by-
law amendments calling for the creation of internal compensation
committees. 51
In addition to the internal corporate solutions, a few successful
challenges to executive self-dealing 52 have been external-through the
flea on the elephant's back" in large public corporations, there is no incentive for shareholders to
act. Id.
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1993). For an more intensive look at the state
corporate law and federal securities law issues arising with regard to shareholders affecting
"ordinary business decisions" by amending the corporation's by-laws, see Longstreth & Kane,
supra note 42, at 6.
48. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); see also Long Park Inc. v. Trenton-
New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1948).
49. See John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 95.
50. See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 38, at 5. Another example of institutional shareholder
influence upon corporate governance involved the New York City pensions funds. These funds
sponsored shareholder resolutions at Bally Manufacturing, W.R. Grace, Polaroid, and USF&G,
calling for compensation committees consisting solely of independent, outside directors with
access to their own outside compensation consultants. Linking Pay To Performance Without the
Fuss, Bus. WK., June 7, 1993, at 7 (letter from Elizabeth Holtzman, Comptroller for the City of
New York); see also Richard A. Melcher, Yankee-Style Activists Strike Boardroom Terror
Abroad, Bus. WK., Mar. 15, 1993, at 74.
51. See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 42, at 6.
52. Shareholder charges of self-dealing occur when an executive has significant power within
a corporation to strongly influence, or simply approve, his own compensation package. See
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 122-24, 345-55. Other types of self-interested transactions
involving the corporation and a director include negotiating and forming contracts with interested
directors and corporate opportunities. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested
Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. CoRPu. L. 997 (1988). The Berle-Means tension between
ownership and management is most apparent when the parties' financial interests are in
opposition. Management's primary interest is maximizing its own wealth through attractive
compensation packages, while the shareholders' main concern is maximizing shareholder wealth
through either stock appreciation or dividend income. See, e.g., Paul Starobin, Feeding at
Capitalism's Trough, 23 NAT'L J., June 8, 1991, at 1369.
Professor Robert Clark maintains that in order to satisfy the disinterested director
requirement, the CEO should not only decline to vote on his own compensation package, but
should simply not attend the meeting. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 6.1, at 194 (1986).
Professor Bogus noted that Berle and Means would disapprove of present day corporate pay
practices:
They would find that the driving force among those responsible for the nation's
largest corporations is avarice, not social responsibility. They would find that
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courts. Where charges of self-dealing exist, courts are more likely to
sustain executive compensation plans where (1) the interested executive
makes full disclosure of the plan and either a committee of disinterested
directors53 or the shareholders approve the compensation, and (2) the
plan is fair to the corporation. 4 As long as these requirements are met,
a court's examination of whether the directors have complied with the
duties of loyalty and care will be subject to the pro-management busi-
ness judgment rule. 5
Even if disinterested directors approve or the shareholders ratify a
particular compensation plan, courts may still strike it down as violating
the corporate waste doctrine. In 1933, the Supreme Court decided Rog-
ers v. Hill,56 the landmark case for shareholder challenges to excessive
compensation plans. The Rogers Court held that even though the share-
holders apparently supported the compensation scheme by allowing it to
continue for several years, the shareholder approval "cannot, against the
protest of a shareholder, be used to justify payments of sums as salaries
so large as in substance and effect to amount to spoilation or waste of
corporate property. 57 But courts are generally unwilling to find a com-
shareholders behave more like casino gamblers than business owners; that directors
are given large fees and perks to keep them quiescent; and that managers live more
like princes than Berle and Means ever dreamed was possible. They would tell us
that, by making them rich, we have perverted the values of corporate managers.
Bogus, supra note 7, at 4 (citation omitted).
53. For a discussion of some of the assumptions that must be made when characterizing a
director as "disinterested," see sources cited supra note 20.
54. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 997-98. Professor Eisenberg believe such self-interested
compensation decisions are treated differently and often more leniently than other self-interested
transactions because of the difficulty in ascertaining a market value for executive labor and
because such transactions are unavoidable. Id. at 1006.
55. Id.; see, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984); Beard v. Elster, 160
A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983).
According to the American Law Institute:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty
[of care] if:
(1) he is not interested in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation.
PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (ALI) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1985), reprinted in
WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 488 (6th ed. 1988).
56. 289 U.S. 582 (1933). Rogers involved a suit by a shareholder seeking restitution against
the American Tobacco Company, asserting that the compensation paid to some of its top six
executives was unreasonable. The compensation plan in question was ratified by the shareholders
and involved an incentive pay system whereby the executives earned a percentage of the
corporation's profits above a certain figure. Over the years, the shareholder never modified the
compensation scheme, and, as a result, as corporate profits rose, so did the executives' bonus. Id.
at 590-91.
57. Id. at 591. The Court stated that "[i]f a bonus payment has no relation to the value of
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pensation scheme unreasonable because of the lack of appropriate guide-
lines to judge whether an executive's remuneration results in corporate
"waste."
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what
yardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuring-
rod? The conscience of equity? Equity is but another name for
human being temporarily judicially robed. He is not omnipotent or
omniscient. Can equity be so arrogant as to hold that it knows more
about managing this corporation than its stockholders?
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments, but
openness forces the confession that the pruning would be synthetic
and artificial rather than analytic or scientific. Whether or not it
would be fair and just, is highly dubious. Yet, merely because the
problem is perplexing is no reason for eschewing it.... It is finding a
rational or just gauge for revising these figures were I inclined to do
so. No blueprints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are
incalculable; the imponderables, manifold. To act out of whimsy or
caprice or arbitrariness would be more than inexact-it would be the
precise antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.58
Consequently, reliance upon internal corporate procedures, particularly
shareholder influence, as well as executive-market restraints, is the only
sensible corporate law control on excessive compensation.
III. REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINTS ON COMPENSATION
The recent uproar over "excessive" pay has probably caused many
to feel that neither the executive market, internal corporate procedures,
nor the courts were effective mechanisms, by themselves, for controlling
executive compensation. Regulatory bodies such as the SEC, FASB,
and the IRS were the obvious choices for reforming compensation prac-
tices in large publicly traded corporations. As a result of the recent com-
motion, two regulatory regimes have emerged: (1) enhanced disclosure,
and (2) increased sanctions.
Although both evolved out of the same "populist" outrage, the
rationale behind the two regulatory approaches is quite different. The
purpose of the improved disclosure rules is "to furnish shareholders with
a more understandable presentation of the nature and extent of executive
services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no
power to give away corporate property against the protest of the minority." Id. at 591-92.
58. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(N.Y. App. Div. 1941). The court further stated that "[c]ourts are ill-equipped to solve or even to
grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical
province. Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its directors,
with the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation
for its officers is primarily for the stockholders." Id. at 680.
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compensation. '' 59 Conversely, under the sanctions approach, the IRS
imposes a penalty upon the corporation for the compensation decisions
of its board that do not comply or conform to a statutorily created level
of frugality. Even though the two regimes take separate approaches to
curbing executive pay abuses, only the enhanced disclosure approach
has received more than a modest level of support. Under this approach,
authority shifts to the shareholders, not the government, to control cor-
porate executive compensation decisions. Part IV of this Comment fur-
ther compares and contrasts the effectiveness of the coexisting
regulatory regimes.
A. Disclosure Reform-SEC and FASB
Responding to criticism of excessive corporate executive pay prac-
tices, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Richard Breeden
established a "three-part SEC initiative on executive compensation" in
February of 1992.60 The first part of the SEC's plan required corpora-
tions to include in their proxy materials shareholder advisory proposals
on executive compensation questions which were previously excludable
as "ordinary business operations" of the company.61 Breeden stated that
the purpose of this modification of proxy policy would "bring a market
solution to a market problem, by allowing the affected private sector
groups-management, directors and shareholders-to resolve the com-
pensation questions in each company ... without government regula-
tion."'62 Secondly, Chairman Breeden announced a plan to enhance the
disclosure requirements of the corporation's executive's compensation
in order to make it easier for shareholders to determine exactly what an
executive earns and why he earned it.63 Finally, the SEC began a study
of the sufficiency of the accounting standards for reporting stock-option
grants.64 In October of 1992, the SEC ultimately adopted two sets of
rule changes: (1) facilitating shareholder communication about corpo-
rate voting matters;65 and (2) giving shareholders unambiguous disclo-
sure about the compensation of their top executives.66
59. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992).
60. Breeden Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 223 (Feb. 21, 1992) (hereinafter Breeden Announcement].
61. Longstreth & Kane, supra note 42, at 7; see also Breeden Announcement, supra note 60,
at 223.
62. Id.
63. Id. This change was necessary, Breeden said, because the old disclosure of executive
compensation was an "impenetrable, legalistic narrative." SEC Adopts Proxy Reforms After Long
Study, Debate, 61 U.S.L.W. 2234 (BNA) (Oct. 27, 1992).
64. Breeden Announcement, supra note 60, at 223.
65. See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992).
66. SEC Adopts Proxy Reforms After Long Study, Debate, supra note 63, at 2235. For the
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The "shareholder communication" changes to the SEC proxy rules
allow easier communication among shareholders and thus provide more
opportunity for concerted action by shareholders by providing that cer-
tain matters submitted for shareholder vote are exempt from some proxy
solicitation requirements. 67 In addition, the changes facilitate share-
holder ability to vote for independent directors who ultimately make the
compensation decisions.68 Also, the rules require companies seeking
proxies to "unbundle" propositions set for a shareholder vote, whereas,
prior rules forced shareholders to vote for a bundle of propositions, some
of which they opposed. 69  Thus, the "shareholder communication"
changes were promulgated in an attempt to make the directors who set
executive compensation more accountable to shareholders.
In addition to the changes in the SEC's proxy rules regarding share-
holder communication, the SEC issued changes in its executive compen-
sation disclosure requirements in order to improve shareholders
comprehension of executive compensation plans. The SEC's reform in
this area was prompted by the desire for better information. "Most prox-
ies don't give a clear picture of exactly what the CEO stands to gain or
what goals he must meet to earn his bonus. Corporate lawyers have
turned proxy obfuscation into an art, keeping shareholders and the com-
petition in the dark. The SEC should demand better."7"
The SEC responded to this problem with radical disclosure reform.
Some experts feel the reforms are actually working.7' The executive
compensation disclosure rules consist of five principal components: (1)
a "Summary Compensation Table" providing an overview of compensa-
tion paid to the CEO and the four highest paid officers; (2) a report by
the compensation committee of the board of directors explaining the cor-
porate performance factors relied on in making compensation decisions;
(3) several tables delineating the details and values of long-term incen-
amended executive compensation disclosure rules, see 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 amended
(1995).
67. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992).
68. SEC Adopts Proxy Reforms After Long Study, Debate, supra note 63, at 2234.
69. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276; SEC Adopts Proxy Reforms After Long Study, Debate, supra note
63, at 2234.
70. Fierman, supra note 21, at 66. The Coca-Cola Company is a good example of this
"obfuscation." In 1992, the company awarded Chairman Roberto C. Goizueta $80 million worth
of restricted stock: "To uncover that generosity, however, shareholders had to search through
dense prose in the proxy statement. Only then would they stumble upon a mention of the award-
with the amount written out in words rather than numbers, making it even harder to find." John
A. Byrne, You Can't Bury CEO Treasure Chests Anymore, Bus. WK., Apr. 26, 1993, at 62.
71. Peter T. Chingos of KPMG Peat Marwick, for example, stated: "If the objective was to
curb abuses in the marketplace, executive-pay disclosure is working .... I am seeing a level of




tives such as stock options and stock appreciation rights; (4) a Perform-
ance Graph comparing the corporation's total shareholder return to
various indices; and (5) disclosure of information regarding relationships
between compensation committee members and the registrant or other
entities that may result in potential conflicts of interest.72 By providing
improved information and disclosure of executive compensation deci-
sions, the SEC intends that shareholder who disagrees with the compen-
sation committee may "remedy" the situation by "vot[ing] against re-
election of committee members as directors, not [by] litigat[ing] in the
courts. 7 3
In addition to the SEC's actions, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board ("FASB"), the organization that establishes and improves
financial accounting and reporting standards, has begun to review the
possibility of reforming the way stock options are disclosed on corporate
financial statements. One of the primary problems with existing com-
pensation reporting standards is that corporations may pay executives in
stock options without having to report the options as a charge against
earnings on financial statements.74
The sad truth is that accounting rules make options as free as those
tinted dollars in the Parker Brothers game. It's funny money. Every-
one agrees that a stock option has real value, yet companies are not
required to charge them against earnings. Because option awards are
essentially free, they're "never measured, never managed."75
During .the 1980s, the FASB considered whether corporations should
treat the cost of stock options as an expense and deduct the cost from
company profits during the period in which the options were granted.
Because of the inability of FASB to come up with an appropriate
method for valuing stock options, FASB never adopted the proposal.
Because of the intensity of the debate over extravagant executive
salaries, the concern over modifying accounting standards for stock
options has resurfaced. 76 Senator Carl Levin, an outspoken critic of
excessive executive compensation, expressed his concern that a corpora-
72. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126-28.
73. Id. at 48,127.
74. Senator Carl Levin referred to stock options as "stealth compensation" because "these
options never appear on the company books as an expense." Executives get the benefit of rises in
stock price and the corporation gets the benefit of not having to show the compensation as an
expense on the books. Hearings on Executive Compensation, supra note 9 (statement of Sen.
Levin).
75. Byrne, supra note 27, at 54 (quoting Raymond C. Lauver, a former member of FASB).
Another problem with stock options is the misunderstanding that executives who receive stock
options are being paid for their performance when, in fact, the increase in stock price may be the
result of a general upswing in the market or inflation. Id.
76. See Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 34.
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tion who grants its executives stock options " 'ought to show [that the
executive's] wealth came out of the company's coffers at shareholder's
expense.' "' The FASB proposal would force companies to carry esti-
mates of the present value of their outstanding options on their financial
statements as a charge against current earnings.78
The FASB's stock option proposal faces staunch opposition from
many organizations-particularly small high-tech companies. 79 George
H. Sollman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Centigram Com-
munications Corporation, opposed such treatment of stock options in
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on
Taxation, and argued that stock options were very important to high-tech
companies. 80  Startup companies and high-tech firms rely on stock
options as a significant component in their compensation packages in
order to attract the innovative employees who might not otherwise
come." These smaller companies typically offer stock options to all
employees, not just top executives. Forcing them to reflect the value of
stock options as an expense would deter these companies from granting
options to most of their employees.
In sum, both the SEC and FASB rely on the concept of providing a
true and accurate depiction of the executive compensation scheme.
Therefore, shareholders may rely on the full disclosure of all material
information when utilizing the internal corporate procedures for affect-
ing corporate pay decisions. Reform in this area should "make compen-
sation disclosure clearer and more concise, and more useful to
shareholders. 82 Full disclosure of compensation information will assist
shareholders in electing and reelecting the ultimate in fair corporate pol-
icy makers-an independent, outside board of directors.
B. Sanction Approach-IRS
Because of the inherent difficulties with allowing corporations to
solve the excessive compensation problem through internal procedures,
some legislators believe that the appropriate means for dealing with
77. John A. Byrne, Clinton Starts a Stampede, Bus. WK., Dec. 14, 1992, at 38.
78. John A. Byrne, 'Hands Off My Stock Pile', Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1993, at 28.
79. Hearings on Executive Compensation, supra note 9.
80. Mr. Sollman listed four explanations for the importance of stock options to startup
companies: "One, employees stock options allow young, cash-strapped firms to compete against
more established companies for scarce technical talent. Two, stock options merge the interests of
employees and the investors. Three, stock options enhance productivity, innovation, and
shareholder value. And four, stock options stretch the very scarce, venture-capital dollars."
Hearings on Executive Compensation, supra note 9.
81. Id.
82. 58 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992).
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excessive executive pay is the Internal Revenue Code.83 Following the
SEC's disclosure reforms, some felt that further reform through the tax
code was unnecessary.8" Nevertheless, prior to the enactment of the new
$1 million cap on the deductibility of executive remuneration,85 Con-
gress debated several compensation-related tax bills that aimed at curb-
ing the abuses of overcompensation. For instance, Representative
Martin Sabo sponsored legislation, entitled the Income Disparities Act
of 1991, that would have denied tax deductions for executive compensa-
tion in excess of twenty-five times the lowest compensation paid to any
employee. 6 Similarly, Senator Tom Harkin introduced legislation
which would have fixed the limit of reasonable compensation 87 to
include only the first $500,000.8 In June 1992, the House of Represent-
atives passed the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992,
which established a $1 million limitation on the deductibility of execu-
tive compensation similar to the provision that eventually became law.89
A version of the $1 million limitation was ultimately part of a bill that
President Bush vetoed.90 Furthermore, Senator DeConcini proposed an
amendment to the provision that was vetoed by President Bush which
would have allowed a deduction of only 75% of executive compensation
in excess of $1 million.9' Finally, as part the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
83. This, of course, is not the first time that commentators have suggested using the Internal
Revenue Code to regulate executive pay. Professor Crystal noted that "[a]s recently as 1963, an
executive who earned taxable income of over $400,000 per year (the equivalent figure today, after
correcting for cost of living changes since 1963, would be around $1.7 million) would have been
subjected to a marginal tax rate ... as high as 91%." CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 25.
Legislative action in other areas of the law have also attempt to curb excessive compensation
practices. For example, the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 requires that federal banking
agencies prescribe standards for compensation, fees, and benefits paid by banks and savings and
loan institutions, and to define what constitutes excessive levels, the payment of which will be
deemed an "unsafe and unsound practice." See Longstreth & Kane, supra note 38, at 7.
84. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Executive Pay: Clinton's Curbs Are Out Of Touch-And
Out Of Bounds, Bus. WK., Mar. 22, 1993, at 33 ("The President may be trying to fix a problem
that's already being solved.").
85. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (Supp. V 1993).
86. H.R. 3056, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). For a look at the problem that Rep. Sabo
wished to address, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
87. Individuals and corporations may take as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including-() a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered .... 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
88. S. 2329, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992). Senator Thomas Daschle proposed a similar bill
which would include cost-of-living adjustments to the $500,000. S. 2261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1992).
89. H.R. 5260, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
90. H.R. 4210, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
91. 138 CONG. REc. S14866 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992).
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iation Act of 1993,92 President Clinton signed into law an amendment to
section 162 that caps the deductibility of certain corporate executive
compensation at $1 million.93
The public policy argument for the enactment of a cap on the
deductibility of "excessive" compensation is simple. As mentioned in
Part I, the increasing gap between the pay of corporate executives and
the average factory worker concerned many, including those in Con-
gress. In addition, Congress felt that taxpayers should not have to subsi-
dize corporations paying senior management huge compensation
packages through a tax deduction for such compensation. Therefore,
Congress placed sanctions on those corporations who could not comply
with an arbitrarily determined "reasonable" level of compensation.94
While the underlying rationale for attempting to control excessive
compensation is commendable, the enacted provisions are filled with
loopholes so that the impact of this legislation is sure to be minimal.
Not only will the new tax code provision be an ineffective means of
lowering executive pay and raising tax revenues, but it will also be more
expensive for shareholders. By disallowing a tax subsidy for excessive
compensation expenses, the government is ultimately shifting the costs
to the shareholders. "By imposing what is, in effect, an excise tax on
executive salaries, Congress may satisfy populist political demands. But
it will hardly improve the economy or respond to the interests of
shareholders." '95
1. THE "OLD" REASONABLE COMPENSATION STANDARD
Some argue that the new limitation on executive remuneration is
not necessary because "excessive" compensation is already not deducti-
ble under the reasonable compensation standard.9 6 Notwithstanding that
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code places a limitation on the
deductibility of applicable employee compensation of $1 million, to be
deductible, the compensation must still be an ordinary and necessary
trade or business expense, and be "a reasonable allowance ... for per-
sonal services actually rendered."97 Therefore, by enacting section
92. More specifically, § 13211 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 469, added § 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code.
93. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (Supp. V 1993).
94. The remainder of this section will demonstrate the numerous loopholes to section 162(m)
so that only ill-advised executive compensation decision makers will actually be penalized for
breaching the $1 million level.
95. Brownstein & Panner, supra note 1, at 33-34.
96. For a discussion of the reasonable compensation standard, see David E. Hoffman,
Heeding Significant Factors Improves the Odds for "Reasonable" Compensation, 50 J. TAX'N
150, 155 (1979).
97. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988).
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162(m), Congress did not intend to set a figure which is per se reason-
able. Instead, Congress simply determined a figure above which it
would no longer subsidize as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.
The IRS and the courts have typically applied a case-by-case deter-
mination of whether compensation is "reasonable. 98 Generally, the
courts consider the following factors:
(1) employee qualifications;
(2) the nature, extent and scope of the work;
(3) the size and complexity of the business;
(4) prevailing general economic conditions;
(5) compensation as a percentage of gross and net income;
(6) compensation compared to distributions to shareholders;
(7) compensation compared to non-shareholder employees and to
prior years; and
(8) prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in
comparable concerns.99
Thus, even if an executive's compensation is less than the statutory $1
million limitation, a corporation may not be allowed to deduct the entire
amount of the compensation if it is not "reasonable" according to the
aforementioned criteria. However, the "reasonable" standard has mainly
been used to limit payments by closely-held companies where nonde-
ductible dividends are disguised as deductible compensation. 00
2. THE NEW LIMITATION ON DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXECUTIVE
REMUNERATION
In response to the public outcry over excessive compensation, Con-
gress enacted section 162(m) as a measure to reduce such compensa-
tion. l"' Section 162(m) 10 2 establishes a general rule that for purposes of
98. Owensby & Kritokos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987).
99. RTS Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1989); see also Rutter v.
Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1988); Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner,
819 F.2d at 1323.
100. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (S.1134), U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA) No. 26, at 69
(June 24, 1993).
101. Id.
102. (M) CERTAIN EXCESSIVE EMPLOYEE REMUNERATION-
(1) IN GENERAL.- In the case of any publicly held corporation, no deduction shall
be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to
any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the
taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000.
(2) PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"publicly held corporation" means any corporation issuing any class of common
equity securities required to be registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
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(3) COVERED EMPLOYEE.- For purposes of this subsection, the term "covered
employee" means any employee of the taxpayer if-
(A) as of the close of the taxable year, such employee is the chief executive
officer of the taxpayer or is an individual acting in such a capacity, or
(B) the total compensation of such employee for the taxable year is required to
be reported to shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
reason of such employee being among the 4 highest compensated officers for
the taxable year (other than the chief executive officer).
(4) APPLICABLE EMPLOYEE REMUNERATION.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) IN GENERAL.- Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term
"applicable employee remuneration" means, with respect to any covered
employee for any taxable year, the aggregate amount allowable as a deduction
under this chapter for such taxable year (determined without regard to this
subsection) for remuneration for services performed by such employee
(whether or not during the taxable year).
(B) EXCEPTION FOR REMUNERATION PAYABLE ON COMMISSION BASIS.- The
term "applicable employee remuneration" shall not include any remuneration
payable on a commission basis solely on account of income generated directly
by the individual performance of the individual to whom such remuneration is
payable.
(C) OTHER PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION.- The term "applicable
employee remuneration" shall not include any remuneration payable solely on
account of the attainment of one or more performance goals, but only if-
(i) the performance goals are determined by a compensation committee of
the board of directors of the taxpayer which is comprised solely of 2 or
more outside directors,
(ii) the material terms under which the remuneration is to be paid,
including the performance goals, are disclosed to shareholders and
approved by a majority of the vote in a separate shareholder vote before
the payment of such remuneration, and
(iii) before any payment of such remuneration, the compensation
committee referred to in clause (i) certifies that the performance goals and
any other material terms were in fact satisfied.
(D) EXCEPTION FOR EXISTING BINDING CONTRACTS.- The term " applicable
employee remuneration" shall not include any remuneration payable under a
written binding contract which was in effect on February 17, 1993, and which
was not modified thereafter in any material respect before such remuneration is
paid.
(E) REMUNERATION.- For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"remuneration" includes any remuneration (including benefits) in any medium
other than cash, but shall not include-
(i) any payment referred to in so much of section 3121(a)(5) as precedes
subparagraph (E) thereof, and
(ii) any benefit provided to or on behalf of an employee if at the time
such benefit is provided it is reasonable to believe that the employee will
be able to exclude such benefit from gross income under this chapter.
For purposes of clause (i), section 3121(a)(5) shall be applied without regard to
section 3121(v)(1).
(F) COORDINATION WITH DISALLOWED GOLDEN PARACHUTE PAYMENTS.- The
dollar limitation contained in paragraph (1) shall be reduced (but not below
zero) by the amount (if any) which would have been included in the applicable
employee remuneration of the covered employee for the taxable year but for
being disallowed under section 280G.
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both the regular tax and alternative minimum tax. Unless an exception
exists, no publicly held corporation can deduct more than $1 million of a
covered employee's total compensation package 10 3 as a section 162
ordinary and necessary trade or business expense.' 0 4 Because of the
ease with which well-advised compensation committees can get around
this provision, coupled with the fact that fewer than 400 executives of
companies earn more than $1 million,'015 section 162(m) is an ineffective
means of controlling executive pay. "[T]he Clinton plan will do little
more than change the way a handful of high-priced execs are paid."' 0 6
a. Publicly-Held Corporation Requirement
The first characteristic that would exclude a corporation from sec-
tion 162(m) treatment is that the corporation must be "publicly held."'0 7
Section 162(m) defines a "publicly held" corporation as one which has
common equity securities that, on the last day of the taxable year, the
SEC requires to be registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.108 Consequently, a "privately held" corporation
may deduct "excessive" executive compensation for income tax pur-
poses,' 0 9 whereas its "publicly held" equivalent may not. If registration
of securities is merely voluntary, then the corporation is not considered
to be "publicly held". 10 Moreover, the proposed regulations provide
that the determination of whether the taxpayer is a publicly held corpo-
103. For purposes of § 162(m), an executive's compensation package includes "any
remuneration (including benefits)" in the form of cash, property, or services, except for
remuneration in the form of (i) contributions to or payments from qualified retirement plans; (ii)
fringe benefits which "at the time such benefit is provided it is reasonable to believe that the
employee will be able to exclude such benefit from gross income"; (iii) specified commissions;
(iv) compensation based upon performance goals; and (v) income payable under a written binding
contract that was in effect on Feb. 17, 1993. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4).
Also note, the $1 million limitation is reduced by the amount of any excess golden parachute
payments (as defined in § 280G) which are not deductible by the corporation. Id. § 162(m)(4)(F).
104. Id. § 162(m)(1).
105. See Gleckman, supra note 84, at 33.
106. Id.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1).
108. Id. § 162(m)(2). A publicly-held corporation required to register under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 generally includes corporations (1) whose securities are listed on
a national securities exchange or (2) that have $5 million or more of assets and 500 or more
shareholders. Fed. Tax Guide Rep. G-2360 (CCH) (Aug. 20, 1993).
109. Of course, compensation must still be "reasonable" within the meaning of § 162(a)(1).
110. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(c)(1)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314 (1993). The Internal Revenue
Service issued proposed regulations on § 162(m) because of the taxpayers need for guidance in
order to comply with the Jan. 1, 1994, effective date. The IRS maintains that these proposed
regulations are not comprehensive, and to the extent the IRS did not cover a particular issue, the
IRS mandates utilizing a "reasonable, good faith interpretation" of the statute. 58 Fed. Reg.
66,310 (1993).
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ration is to be made on the last day of the taxable year."' Thus, the $1
million limitation seemingly does not apply to a corporation that goes
private on the last day of its taxable year. The regulations further pro-
vide that "publicly held corporation" includes corporations within an
affiliated group even if they do not file a consolidated income tax
return.
112
b. Covered Employee Requirement
In addition to requiring that the corporation be "publicly held," the
statute provides that the $1 million limitation does not apply unless the
employee qualifies as a "covered employee"'" 3 on the last day of the
taxable year. 14  Section 162(m)(3) defines a "covered employee" as
either (1) the chief executive officer or one acting in such capacity, or
(2) the four highest compensated officers, other than the chief executive
officer, whose "total compensation . . . is required to be reported to
shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."''1 5 Further-
more, the regulations provide that an employee who is not employed by
the corporation on the last day of the taxable year does not qualify as a
"covered employee."' 1 6 Therefore, the amount of compensation, the
executive compensation disclosure rules of the 1934 Act," 7 and the
employment status of the executive on the last day of the taxable year
determine whether the individual is a "covered employee."' 1 8 Unless
characterized as a covered employee, that employee's compensation is
exempt from the $1 million limitation.
1I1. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167-27(c)(1)(i), 66,314, 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314 (1993).
112. Id. § 1.167-27(c)(1)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314. Section 1504 of the Internal Revenue Code
defines an affiliated group.
113. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1).
114. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167-27(c)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(3). Thus, if corporations are required to disclose the compensation of
fewer than four executives, only those for whom disclosure is required are covered employees.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (S. 1134), supra note 100, at 70.
116. Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.162-27(c)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314.
117. The reference in I.R.C. § 162(m)(3)(B) to compensation "required to be reported to
shareholder under [the 1934 Act]" pertains to the SEC's disclosure rules, which require disclosure
in a corporation's proxy statements of the compensation of its CEO and its four highest
compensated officers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1995); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (1995). For a
discussion of the SEC's executive compensation disclosure rules, see supra part III.A.
118. There was considerable debate in Congress over why the excessive compensation rules
would only apply to corporate executives and not other highly paid individuals such as athletes
and entertainers. For example, Rep. Gerald Solomon of New York noted an article published in
the Wall Street Journal, entitled "The FOB Loophole," which discussed the inequities in the new
amendment (FOB stands for "Friend of Bill Clinton"). Rep. Solomon noted that Barbara
Streisand, who made $20 million in two days of work for MGM, would be taxed at a considerably
lower rate than an executive at MGM making the same amount for the entire year. 139 CONG.
REc. E2460 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1993) (statement of Rep. Solomon) (quoting The FOB Loophole,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993).
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c. Compensation-in-the-Form-of-Commissions"1 9 Exception
In order to determine the amount of "applicable employee remuner-
ation" for purposes of computing "excessive" compensation of a "cov-
ered employee," a corporation must exclude "any renumeration payable
on a commission basis solely on account of income generated directly
by the individual performance of the individual."'' 20 Employee compen-
sation does not fail this test simply because the individual has the use of
support services such as secretarial or research services. 12  Moreover,
commissions based upon income generated by a "business unit" within
the corporation do not qualify under this exception.122 Certainly, the
main problem here is determining at what point one can attribute income
directly to efforts of an individual employee as opposed to an entire
business unit.
d. Performance-Based Compensation Exception
Probably the most complex and burdensome exceptions to the
deduction limitation within section 162(m) is compensation paid on
account of "one or more performance goals"' 23-performance-based
compensation. The theory behind excluding such compensation reflects
the criticism by many that the yearly pay of CEO's in the past had no
significant correlation to the company's overall performance.' 24 In fact,
while corporate profits decreased by 7% in 1990, CEO pay increased by
7%.125 Presenting corporations with an incentive to better equate CEO
compensation with the firm's overall performance is one means by
which Congress sought to remedy the overcompensation problem.
In order to qualify as performance-based compensation, four
requirements must be met.' 26 First, qualified performance-based com-
pensation must be attributable to the achievement "of one or more
preestablished, objective performance goals."'' 27 Prior to the commence-
119. Although commission-based compensation is generally based upon performance, I treat
commissions separately because, for purposes of computing total compensation, publicly held
corporations may exclude commissions without regard to the four part test to exclude
"performance-based compensation." 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(B).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(B).
121. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(d), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,314-15.
122. Id., 58 Fed. Reg. 66,315. Neither the actual provision nor the proposed regulations define
"business unit," but it seems quite clear that a "business unit" refers to a group of more than one
individuals.
123. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
124. For a more explicit discussion of the pay for performance problem, see notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
125. Hearings on Executive Compensation, supra note 9 (statement of Sen. Boren).
126. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)-(iii).
127. Prop. Treas. Reg. § !.162-27(e)(2)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,315.
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ment of the services for which the compensation committee establishes
particular performance goals and before the outcome of the performance
goals is certain, the corporation's compensation committee must set
forth, in writing, the particular performance goals. 2 Not only must the
compensation committee preestablish the performance goals, but the
goals must be objective. In other words, the performance goals must be
such that "a third party having knowledge of the relevant facts could
determine whether the goal is met."' 29 Moreover, in order for a particu-
lar performance goal to be "objective," a third party with knowledge of
the applicable performance results should be able to calculate the
amount of compensation.' 30 Although this objective standard requires
the performance goals be fixed and the amount of compensation be non-
discretionary, the proposed regulations allow the compensation commit-
tee the discretion to reduce, but not enlarge, the amount of compensation
or other economic benefit even if the employee achieves the perform-
ance goals. ' 3i
Compensation committees may use one or more of the following
business criteria to set performance goals: stock price, market share,
sales volume, earnings per share, return on equity, or costs. 132 The com-
pensation committee may, nonetheless, simply base performance deter-
minations upon "maintaining the status quo or limiting economic
losses."'133 As such, preestablished, objective performance goals do not
necessarily mandate a showing of what one typically perceives as posi-
tive business results. The proposed regulations expressly prohibit, how-
ever, predicating performance pay solely upon "continued employment"
of the corporate officer. 134
Notwithstanding the three additional performance-based compensa-
tion requirements, the preestablished, objective performance require-
ment is, for the most part, illusory. Because of the broad definition of an
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,315.
131. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,315.
The IRS and Treasury believe that the retention of 'negative' discretion to reduce
compensation does not undercut the policies underlying the exception for
performance-based compensation under section 162(m). Moreover, discussions
with the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission and suggestions received
from taxpayers, shareholders, and other interested parties indicate that it is desirable
for directors to retain this discretion in order to take into account other subjective
factors and to preserve their flexibility to act in the best interest of the company and
its shareholders.
58 Fed. Reg. 66,311.





authorized "performance goal" and the relative ease with which crafty
lawyers or compensation consultants can draft performance goals which
are easy to achieve, section 162(m)(4)(c) creates a loophole. The rules
and regulations are unclear as to whether a corporation can set pay based
upon the attainment of an almost certain goal. For example, would it be
an appropriate for the Walt Disney Company to base some or all of
Michael Eisner's "performance-based" compensation upon the sale of
500 tickets to one of its many theme parks? Or, could Coca-Cola pay its
CEO a large "performance-based" bonus upon keeping its stock price
above $10 per share for the year?' 35 The regulations require a facts and
circumstances analysis to determine whether the employee would
receive all or part of the compensation, regardless of whether the
employee attains the performance goal. 136 If so, the compensation does
not qualify as "performance-based."' 37 Therefore, if an executive's
compensation is "nominally or partially contingent on attaining a per-
formance goal,"' 38 then none of the payment associated with that partic-
ular grant or award qualifies for this exception.
The second requirement of the performance-based compensation
exception is that a compensation committee of the board of directors,
comprised solely of two or more outside directors, must establish the
performance goals. 139 A director is not "considered an outside director
if the individual: (1) is a current employee of the corporation, (2) is a
former employee ...receiving compensation for prior services (other
than benefits under a tax-qualified retirement or savings plan), (3) has
been an officer of the corporation at any time, [or] (4) is receiving com-
pensation in any capacity other than as a director."' 40 In addition, the
proposed regulations deem certain payments to entities in which a direc-
tor has an ownership interest as paid to the director, subject to a de
minimis payment rule.' 4 '
The third requirement necessary to qualify for the performance-
based compensation exemption is that the material terms of the perform-
ance goal be fully disclosed to shareholders and approved by a majority
shareholder vote before payment of such remuneration.' 42 If the com-
135. As of March, 1994, Coca-Cola stock was trading on the New York Stock exchange at
around $40 per share. WALL. ST. J., Mar. 12, 1994, at C3.
136. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iv), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,315.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i).
140. 58 Fed. Reg. 66,312.
141. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,317. For further discussion of the
de minimis rule, see Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Executive Compensation, reprinted
in 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 93-15 (1994), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii).
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pensation would be paid regardless of whether the shareholders approve,
the performance-based exception does not apply. 143 The material terms
required to be disclosed include (1) the individuals eligible to receive
compensation, (2) a description of the business criteria upon which the
performance goals are based, and (3) either the maximum amount of the
compensation to be paid or the formula used to calculate the amount of
compensation if the performance goal is attained.' 4 The proposed regu-
lations also provide that to the extent that the regulations do not cover
disclosure of the material terms of the performance goals, the disclosure
rules of the SEC apply.' 45 In the case of performance-based compensa-
tion other than stock options, the shareholder approval requirement is
met if the shareholders approve the specific terms of the plan, as well as
the class of executives to which it applies.' 46 If the compensation plan
involves stock options, "the shareholders generally must approve the
specific terms of the option plan, the class of executives to which it
applies, the option price or formula for setting the price, and the maxi-
mum number of shares subject to the option that can be awarded under
the plan to any executive."'1 47 Also, unless a material change in a plan
occurs, no further shareholder approval is required once a plan has been
approved. 148
Finally, the compensation committee must certify, in writing, that
the executive has satisfied the performance goals and any other material
terms before the corporation pays a covered employee his remunera-
tion.' 49 However, "[c]ertification by the compensation committee is not
required for compensation that is attributable solely to the increase in the
stock of the publicly held corporation."'' 50 Thus, in order to qualify for
the performance-based compensation exception, a "covered employee"
must meet the performance goal preestablished by a committee consist-
ing of two or more outside directors, the material terms of which have
been fully disclosed to and approved by shareholders, and the compen-
sation committee must certify that the performance goal has been
satisfied.
e. Grandfather Clause-Binding Contract Exception
The fifth and final exception to the excessive employee remunera-
143. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,317.
144. Id.
145. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(v), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,318.
146. Fed. Tax Guide Rep. G-2360 (CCH) (Aug. 20, 1993).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii).
150. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,318-19.
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tion rules is for binding employment contracts that were in effect on or
before February 17, 1993, and that were not modified in any material
respect before such remuneration was paid. 1 ' This exception does not
apply unless, under the applicable state law, "the corporation is obli-
gated to pay the compensation if the employee performs services."1 52
Furthermore, a contract that is either renewed after February 17, 1993,
or terminable by the corporation after February 17, 1993, is not treated
as a binding contract as of that date. 153
The $1 million cap on a corporation's ability to deduct executive
compensation as an ordinary and necessary business expense is thus
overflowing with easily attainable exceptions. The statute is not a useful
mechanism for controlling excessive executive compensation as it does
not prohibit companies from paying whatever they consider appropriate.
It only limits the deductible amount to $1 million per covered execu-
tive.154 The only effect, if any, that the provision will have is to effec-
tively shift the cost of executives' salaries from the corporation to the
shareholders.' 55 However, in that respect, it provides incentive for
shareholders to ensure that compensation levels remain "reasonable" and
below the $1 million cap and also removes the burden from taxpayers
who have been subsidizing "excessive" compensation. If shareholders
feel that an executive is worth millions, then they have every right to pay
it. " 'Shareholders are going to hold the company more accountable
than the taxpayers are .... In terms of general tax fairness, and who is
bearing the brunt of the costs and who is receiving the benefits, it seems
appropriate.' "156
Companies are still going to have to pay what the market requires,
but they will hire compensation consultants and crafty attorneys to
design compensation packages that are not effected by the deduction
limitation. Because few corporations will actually be subject to this pro-
vision, and those who are subject will likely pay compensation consul-
tants a nice fee to find ways around this tax penalty, the effectiveness of
this amendment is surely in question.
IV. DiSCLOSURE REGIME Vs. TAX PENALTY REGIME
While the SEC's approach to monitoring executive pay by increas-
151. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(D).
152. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(h)(1)(i), 58 Fed. Reg. 66,319.
153. Id.
154. See Allison L. Cowan, A Corporate-Tax Approach To Curbing Executives' Pay, N.Y.
TirMs, June 11, 1992, at Dl.
155. Id. at D7.
156. Id. (quoting Issac Shapiro, a senior research analyst for the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, a Washington research center that supports the provision).
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ing the clarity of executive compensation disclosure has received
applause from virtually every affected party, the IRS's imposition of a
tax penalty for excessive compensation has not been so fortunate.
Advocates for the disclosure regime note the benefits of shifting more
corporate control to the shareholder through increased availability of
information regarding executive compensation. With the help of large
institutional investors and shareholder activist groups, shareholders will
now have a more powerful role in corporate decisionmaking, and conse-
quently will be in a better position to protect their investment from cor-
porate "waste." By allowing these disclosure reforms, the SEC has
effectively encouraged greater accountability of the board of directors in
fulfilling their fiduciary duties to shareholders.
The IRS approach, on the other hand, is not to protect shareholder
interests by providing shareholders the ability to make more prudent
investment decisions. (In fact, public access to the corporation's tax
return is not allowed without the consent of the taxpayer. Therefore,
without the SEC's executive compensation disclosure rules, the invest-
ing public would have no protection against investing in corporations
with excessive pay practices.) The IRS approach's main thrust is the
imposition of a tax penalty for compensation above $1 million so that
taxpayers no longer subsidize large executive salaries. 157 Even though
parts of the new tax provision rely on the SEC's disclosure require-
ments, the IRS approach is effectively a modest increase in revenue at
the expense of ill-advised corporate compensation committees.
The IRS provision does not force a company to reconsider the
amount of money it pays its executives, just how it pays them. With the
enactment of the cap on the deductibility of executive compensation,
compensation committees who wish to pay their executive's million-
dollar salaries will simply have to hire compensation consultants to
design compensation plans that qualify for one of the applicable excep-
tions-particularly the performance-based compensation exception.
Although this might influence compensation committees to link an exec-
utive's pay to the corporation's performance, it does not require it.
In contrast, the SEC's comprehensive disclosure allows for
increased shareholder scrutiny of both the amount and type of pay.
Although the SEC modified the rules to allow shareholders to have an
advisory role in "ordinary" compensation decisions, increased disclosure
will force the board of directors to justify their compensation decisions
to the shareholders and thus facilitate arm's-length bargaining between
executives and the board of directors.




Who decided that $1 million was a "reasonable" amount of execu-
tive compensation? The $1 million cap amount is simply an arbitrary
figure for determining "excessive" compensation.
The appropriate level of compensation of corporate officers depends
on the specific circumstances of each particular company in a particu-
lar time period. Compensation that might seem excessive in one
company, could be inadequate in another. And what is deemed appro-
priate must be constantly adjusted to reflect the circumstances of the
company at the most recent times.1 58
For example, a successful CEO sought after by several competing cor-
porations who wish to pay him millions of dollars is very different from
a CEO who takes advantage of his influential position to urge directors
that he's worth several million dollars. The SEC's disclosure regime
specifically addresses this situation by allowing shareholders to partici-
pate in a "reasonableness" determination.
It is quite difficult to imagine how a $1 million limitation on the tax
deductibility of executive compensation can be an effective means of
controlling executive pay, much less a viable means for raising reve-
nues. Section 162(m) provides several alternative means by which a
compensation committee can get around the limitation amount so that
the shareholders will not have to absorb the cost of a disallowed deduc-
tion. On the other hand, the SEC disclosure approach, standing alone,
has already impacted several board's compensation decisions. 159 In
addition, with the potential reform of the FASB accounting standards for
valuing stock options, shareholders will have access to significant
amounts of compensation information with which to evaluate invest-
ment opportunities. Therefore, while the SEC approach of improving
shareholder's position in corporate governance is beneficial, the IRS
approach of "limiting" the deduction for excessive compensation at $1
million is entirely unnecessary and ineffective.
V. CONCLUSION
Years of abusive corporate pay practices by top executives and
boards of directors have culminated in a full-throttled attempt by gov-
ernmental bodies to intervene in corporate governance. From one point
of view, the SEC's disclosure and proxy reform shifts some of the bal-
ance of power away from senior management and back to the owners.
In addition, one might expect new accounting standards for valuing
stock options in order to better inform shareholders of executives' "true"
158. Hearing on Executive Compensation, supra note 9 (statement of SEC Chairman Richard
C. Breeden).
159. See supra notes 32 & 71 and accompanying text.
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compensation. As a result, shareholders will be able to more easily
ascertain exactly what an executive earns and to adjust future compensa-
tion decisions accordingly.
Limiting executive pay through the income tax code, however, is an
entirely different situation. Shareholders will not benefit from the new
provision unless the compensation committee chooses to tie the execu-
tive's compensation more closely to the corporation's overall perform-
ance. In fact, those few corporations actually affected by the $1 million
limitation who wish to continue paying more than $1 million to its exec-
utives will simply be shifting the tax burden to shareholders. Thus, the
only worthwhile reason for this provision is to encourage corporations to
tie highly-paid executives' compensation to the company's performance.
It is unclear whether any of the existing restraints on "excessive"
compensation will actually have significant impact on executive com-
pensation in the future. Perhaps compensation consultants will find new
ways not only to avoid the income tax penalty for certain compensation
above $1 million, but also to satisfy shareholders that individual com-
pensation packages are in fact what the particular executive is worth in
the executive labor market. CEOs atop successful corporations will
likely have more bargaining power with shareholders in compensation
decisions than CEOs in less successful corporations. Certainly, a suc-
cessful CEO can always accept a similar position at a competing corpo-
ration willing to pay what the CEO wishes. However, any regulatory
regime that can somehow grant shareholders more power over compen-
sation decisions than they have had in the past is a positive step toward
improving the inherent problems with existing compensation practices.
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